























Abstract - In this paper we propose a model of natural recovery, a widespread yet unexplained aspect of 
addictive behavior, starting from the recent theory developed by Bernheim and Rangel (2004). While the 
Bernheim and Rangel model generates many distinctive patterns of addiction, it does not explicitly consider 
pathways to natural recovery. Based on insights from neurosciences, we introduce an ”implicit cognitive 
appraisal” process depending on past experiences as well as on future expected consequences of addictive 
consumption. Such function a_ects the individual in two ways: it erodes the payo_ from use as the decision 
maker grows older and it increases the cognitive control competing with the hedonic impulses to use, thus 
reducing the probability of making mistakes. While we do recognize the importance of allowing for cue 
triggered mistakes in individual decision making, our model recovers an important role for cognitive 
processes, such as subjective cost-benefit evaluations, in explaining natural recovery. 
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 ...isn’t it remarkable that the behavior of even rea-
sonably intelligent individuals can be as idiosyn-
cratic, seemingly irrational, and sometimes patently
counterproductive as it often appears to be?...
Cohen and Blum (2002)
1 Introduction
Addiction is currently deﬁned as the consequence of repeated use of psychoactive
drugs. Itischaracterizedprincipallybyalossofcontroloverdrugseekingbehavior
withharmfuleectsontheindividualandahighprobabilityofrelapseevenmonths
or years after cessation of drug taking (Volkow and Fowler, 2000; Kelley, 2004;
Weiss, 2005).
The main problem is to understand how this phenomenon “moves”, meaning
howthevariouscomponentsofitsmultifactoriality(individual, substanceandenvi-
ronment) can trigger the start, sustain recurrence or generate the frustrating relapse.
Recent economic theories of addiction can be loosely classiﬁed as variations
or generalizations of the rational addiction model by Becker and Murphy (1988).
Such generalizations allow for the presence of random cues that increase the
marginal utility of consumption (Laibson, 2001); “projection bias” (Lowenstein
et al., 2003); present-biased preferences and sophisticated or naive expectations
(Gruber and Koszegi, 2001); “temptation” (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001) where
well-being depends not only upon the chosen action, but also upon the action not
chosen.
The Bernheim and Rangel (B&R) 2004 model instead regards addiction as a
progressive susceptibility to stochastic environmental cues that can trigger mis-
taken usage. The points of departure of this theory from previous ones are: ﬁrst,
its attempt to harmonize economic theory with evidence from psychology, neuro-
science and clinical practice so as to explain the relationship between behavior and
the characteristics of the user, substance and the environment mentioned above
(B&R, 2004, p.1559); second, the perception of consumption of addictive sub-
stances as mistakes. Neuroscience and clinical practice have indeed shown that
addictive substances systematically interfere with the proper operation of a process
used by the brain to forecast near term hedonic rewards and lead to strong impulses
towards consumption that may interfere with higher cognitive control. In this case
individual consumption choices are sometimes driven by a rational decision mak-
ing process, sometimes by strong impulses leading to mistakes, i.e. to a divergence
between choices and preferences.
The B&R 2004 model can explain several patterns of addictive behavior, but
there is one aspect left unexplained which is spontaneous remittance also known
1as natural recovery. Clinical practice shows that this is not an infrequent pattern of
behavior in long term addicts, but the reasons for it are still to be recovered. The
main purpose of this paper is to extend the B&R 2004 model to explain natural
recovery. This result will be achieved introducing in the original framework an
”Implicit Cognitive Appraisal” function, depending on past experiences as well
as on future consequences of addictive consumption. Such function aects the
individual in two ways: it erodes the payo from use as the decision maker grows
older and it increases the cognitive control competing with the hedonic impulses to
use, thus reducing the probability of entering the hot mode. Performance analysis
of the extended model is then carried out by comparing our results to those of the
original model.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a clinical description of
addiction. Section 3 introduces the phenomenon of natural recovery. Section 4
reports the basic formulation of the B&R model of addiction and develops the ex-
tended model. Policy implications are discussed in Section 5. Concluding remarks
and directions for future research are drawn in Section 6.
2 The neuroscience of addictive behavior
In human beings drugs produce an increase of dopamine concentration at target-
cells’ receptor levels, as they stimulate the nigrostriatal (controlling motor coordi-
nation) and corticolimbic (controlling emotions and cognitive abilities) dopamin-
ergic systems (Wise, 2004).
These cerebral systems have evolved not to entertain addictive substances, but
to ensure the survival of the individual by controlling basic functions such as mat-
ing, consumption, searching for food and water, etc. Once these systems are en-
gaged by natural rewards (food or sex for example) or by addictive substances
(Kelley, 2004; Nestler, 2005) dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens and in
other cerebral sites increases, causing speciﬁc emotional states (for example, eu-
phoria) that are powerful drivers and reinforce that behavior. The individual is thus
induced to repeat such positive experiences (or avoid them when negative), pre-
cisely because he associates the speciﬁc function to its hedonic (likeable) eects
(Kelley and Berridge, 2002; Bechara, 2005; Kalivas and Volkow, 2005).
Addictive substances have an advantage over natural rewards: they produce a
higher dopamine concentration by stimulating the system more powerfully and for
longer periods (Hyman, 2005). Moreover, in the case of natural rewards, a habit
develops after some time which reduces the importance of the experiential act. In
other words the quality and quantity of the gained pleasure diminishes. Addictive
substances, instead, act like powerful “novelties” activating each time, in a non-
decremental way, dopaminergic transmission even after repeated use.
Chronic substance abuse induces profound alterations of the cerebral mecha-
nisms just mentioned which “force”, in a way, the user to make compulsory and
“wrong” choices, i.e. choices that diverge from preferences. In fact, drugs by pow-
erfully activating dopaminergic transmission reinforce excessively the associated
2learning process, ending up by constraining the individual’s behavioral choices
(Berke and Hyman, 2000). In other words, drugs seem to aect the basic forecast-
ing mechanism, a simple system for learning correlations between current condi-
tions, decisions and short term rewards. As Bernheim and Rangel put it (B&R,
2005, p. 109) ”this basic forecasting mechanism is very fast and ecient at learn-
ing simple action-reward correlations, but it’s inﬂexible and unsophisticated be-
cause it can only learn about a limited range of near-term consequences. Higher
cognition is more ﬂexible and sophisticated, but it is comparatively slow.”
They call this process Hedonic Forecasting Mechanism (HFM henceforth).
Apparently there is a consensus in neuroscience according to which addiction re-
sults from the impact the addictive substances have on the HFM. With repeated
use of a substance, the cues associated with past consumption cause the HFM to
forecast exaggerated pleasure responses, creating a disproportionate impulse to use
leading to mistakes in decision making (B&R, 2005).
The pleasure following use, the excessive and rapid hedonic expectation in-
duced by the HFM, the progressive failing of the frontal cortex to counterbalance
with rational choices the more alluring oer of drugs, all portray a process that
invariably regenerates itself and seems to have no end (Kelley and Berridge, 2002;
Berridge, 2004). Although drug addiction seems to lead to just one possible result,
for still unclear reasons, often the patient stops participating in the ineluctable dy-
namics of her/his case and ceases to have this insatiable hunger and compulsion
for the drug.
This may happen as a consequence of psychological, social, pharmacological
and individual interactions as well as all other stimuli found inside and around an
individual (deterministic or even stochastic events).
In more general terms, one could say that the multifactoriality sustaining drug
addiction sometimes ceases to oer those proﬁts or conveniences considered up till
then as indispensable.
3 Natural Recovery
Epidemiological studies, considering pathways out of alcohol abuse without the
utilization of professional help (otherwise known as natural recovery) give evi-
dence that the majority of quitting taking place without professional assistance
in various countries reveal rates between 66.7% in Germany to 77% in Canada
(Bischof et al., 2003).
Despite this striking evidence, natural recovery remains basically an unex-
plained phenomenon even though it is of interest to dierent major disciplines,
such as economics, psychology and sociology. Natural recovery may occur in at
least three dierent ways: (i) cold turkey quitting due to an exogenous shock; (ii)
cold turkey quitting happening without an exogenous shock; (iii) gradual quitting
occurring after a period of continuous decrease in consumption. We are particu-
larly interested in case (ii) and argue that quitting is the explicit manifestation of
3an inner process of ”self appraisal” that ultimately brings to quitting consumption
of the addictive substance. Such process is also the main determinant of quitting
in case (i) where the role played by the exogenous shock is that of a strong incen-
tive accelerating a mechanism that, however, has already begun to develop within
the addict. Case (iii) is of minor interest since clinical practice suggests only a
minority of natural recoveries happening in this way.
Clinical and experimental research have studied natural recovery from sub-
stance abuse since the mid-1970s (Vaillant, 1982; Klingemann, 1991) focusing on
triggering mechanisms, maintenance factors and on trying to identify common rea-
sons for change in substance use. Such studies reveal that although there may be
dierences in the ways in which it occurs, spontaneous remittance characterizes
the whole spectrum of drugs such as alcohol (Cunningham et al. 2006; Bischof et
al. 2000; Weisner et al. 2003; Matzger et al. 2005; Bischof et al., 2003), marijuana
(Copersino et al., 2006), multiple drugs, binge eating, smoking, sex and gambling
(Hanninen et al., 1999). To our knowledge, however, there are very few studies de-
scribing pathways to natural recovery in an economic model of addiction. Among
such studies the Becker & Murphy (1988) model of addictive behavior generates
cold turkey quitting through exogenous shocks or stressful events, whereas Sura-
novic et al. (1999) extend the Becker model to generate cold turkey quitting of
cigarettes’ smoking without relying on exogenous shocks or stressful events. The
motivation to quit is based instead on changes in the addict’s perspective as he
grows older. In addition, this model also shows that some individuals may quit
addiction by gradually reducing consumption over time. These key results are
obtained by explicitly taking into account the withdrawal eects (quitting costs)
experienced when users try to quit and by explicit recognition that the negative
health eects of addiction generally appear late in an individual’s life.
Both models are rational models of behavior and presuppose a standard in-
tertemporal decision making implying a complete alignment of choices and time
consistent preferences, thereby denying the possibility of mistakes.
However, recent studies in neuroscience support the view that the consumption
of addictive substances can be sometimes rational and sometimes a cue-triggered
mistake (B&R, 2005). These insights from neuroscience have led to a new eco-
nomic theory of addiction that tries to bridge the gap between neuroscience and
decision making and depicts addiction as a progressive susceptibility to stochastic
environmental cues triggering mistaken usage.
This theory generates many distinctive behavioral patterns of addiction requir-
ing explanation, but it does not explicitly model pathways to natural recovery. The
authors, however, hint at possibilities to extend their model including ”developing
a more complete model of cognitive control in which future consequences may in-
ﬂuence the likelihood of overriding HFM-generated impulses (through the thresh-
old MT)” (see B&R, 2004, p. 1582).
Our main purpose is to explain how natural recovery may occur. To this aim
we extend the B& R model introducing a Loss Function that aects the individual
in two ways: it erodes the payo from use as the decision maker (DM) grows
4older; it rises the threshold MT so as to increase the cognitive control competing
with the hedonic forecasting mechanism (HFM), thus reducing the probability of
making mistakes. The key process involves a mechanism that we call ”Implicit
Cognitive Appraisal” function incorporating future expected losses as well as past
experiences from addiction.
Our model may have important policy implications, because it places a high
value on measures that increase the likelihood of successful self-regulation with-
out forcing particular choices and eventually leading to natural recovery. It also
strengthens the role for ”cognitive” policies (B&R, 2005, p. 136), i.e. those in-
creasing cognitive control such as education, creation of counter cues and policies
that help the accumulation of social capital.
3.1 Reasons for spontaneous quitting
Matzger et al. (2005), in a study of the reasons for drinking less, assess that
triggering mechanisms, the interpersonal and environmental inﬂuences that cause
a person to move from problematic alcohol use to sustained abstinence or non-
problematic use, can be varied and multidimensional and often involve a combi-
nation of both short and long term pressures. In this study two groups of problem
drinking adults, who reported drinking less at the one year follow up, were iden-
tiﬁed in Northern California: the ﬁrst group came from a probability sample in
the general population; the second was originated through a survey of consecutive
admissions to public and private alcohol and drug problems. A logit model was
then used to assess the determinants of sustained remission from problem drinking.
Results showed that the two most frequently endorsed reasons for cutting down
were the same for both groups: self-evaluation, i.e. weighing the pros and cons of
drinking and not drinking and experiencing a major change in lifestyle. Drinking
causing health problems was also an important reason for quitting. Self-evaluation
implies that recovery is not necessarily triggered by negative or traumatic events,
but alternatively comes about through a period of self-reﬂection. Interventions by
medical personnel and family members were either non-signiﬁcant predictors or
signiﬁcantly negatively related to sustained improvement for both the general pop-
ulation and treated drinkers.
Cunninghametal. (2005)givesupporttoboththe”cognitiveappraisal”andthe
”life events” motivations for quitting. In their study they noted that individuals who
recovered without treatment went through a process of cognitive appraisal (also
known as the motivational explanation for quitting) in which they weighed the pros
and cons of drinking and not drinking and decided that the pros outweighed the
cons. Anticipated costs and beneﬁts of change is thus one means of measuring the
respondents’ motivational explanation for quitting. The ”life events” motivation is
instead based on past life events. It is hypothesized that addicts’ life events prior to
and after their quit attempt are related to successful quitting attempts. Respondents
experiencing the greatest reduction in their negative life events pre to post quit
attempts were hypothesized to be most likely to have successfully reduced or quit
5their addiction.
Reasons for quitting may vary according to the substance of abuse and the
addict’s age. Copersino et al. (2006) report that reasons for quitting marijuana
by the adults are dierent from those reported by adolescents. This is important,
because individual reasons for quitting may inﬂuence the success and duration of
the quit attempt. However, the reasons for quitting marijuana reported by the adults
are more similar to the reasons given by spontaneous quitters from most licit and
illicit substances1, i.e. concerns about the negative impact on one’s health and on
self and social image.
4 The model
The following analysis is related to the behavioral addiction model developed
by Bernheim and Rangel (2004)2. The B&R theory is based on the following
premises: a) consumption among addicts is frequently a mistake; b) previous ex-
perience with an addictive good sensitizes an individual to environmental cues that
trigger mistaken usage; c) awareness of sensitivity to cue-triggered mistakes pro-
duces attempts to manage the process with some degree of sophistication. While
the second and third premises are also present in other recent models of addictive
consumption, such as Laibson’s Cue-Theory of Consumption (2001) for instance,
the perception of consumption of addictive substances as mistakes is an original
feature of the B&R model. This stems from recent advances in neurosciences
stressing that addictive substances are dierent from others in the way they inter-
fere with the normal operation of the brain. The combination of these two factors,
i.e. a rather precise understanding of the alterations of the cerebral mechanisms
produced by addictive substances and the perception of consumption as a mistake
which follows represents an advancement with respect to other addiction theories.
The model involves a decision maker (DM) living for an inﬁnite number of dis-
crete periods who can operate either in a cold (involving rationality) or hot mode
(where decisions and preferences may diverge). Time is discrete, indexed by the
nonnegative integers, t 2 f0;1;2;:::g. Each time period the DM makes two deci-
sions in succession. First, he selects a ”lifestyle” at from the set fE;A;Rg (e.g.
going to a bar or staying at home watching TV or reading a book). If lifestyle
E, ”exposure”, is chosen there is a high likelihood that the DM will encounter
a large number of substance-related cues. Activity A, ”avoidance”, entails fewer
substance-related cues and may also reduce sensitivity to environmental cues. Ac-
tivity R, ”rehabilitation”, implies a commitment to clinical treatment, the cost of
which is rs, and it may further reduce exposure and sensitivity to substance-related
cues.
1Except for cigarettes smokers who report quitting more because of feelings of disgust and the
desire and will to quit.
2The model described in this Section is based on the theory developed by Bernheim and Rangel,
while all the functions and parameters are chosen by the authors.
6Second, he allocates resources between a potentially addictive good/substance,
xt 2 f0;1g, the price of which is q, and a non addictive good (es  0)3. By assump-
tion the DM can not borrow or save. Each period is entered in cold mode and the
DM chooses his lifestyle rationally. This choice, along with the addictive state, st,
determines the probability pa
s;t with which he encounters cues that trigger the hot
mode (see below). With some transition probability pT, consumption of the addic-
tive substance in state st at time t moves the individual to a higher addictive state,
st+1 at time t+1, and abstention moves him to a lower addictive state st 1 at time
t+1. There are S +1 addictive states labeled st = 0;1;:::;S. The system dynamics
is described by the evolution of state st according to the following equation:
st+1 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
min

pT (st + 1) + (1   pT)st;S
	
if xt = 1;at 2 fE;Ag
Max

1; pT (st   1) + (1   pT)st
	
if xt = 0;at 2 fE;A;Rg
(1)
Equation (1) implies that usage in state st leads to state minfS; st + 1g in the next
period with probability pT. No use leads to state maxf1; st  1g with probability pT
from state s > 1 and to state 0 from state 0.
The volume of substance related environmental cues encountered, c(a;!;t),
depends on the lifestyle and on an exogenous state of nature !t drawn randomly
from a state space 
 according to some probability measure . The impulses
c(a;!;t) place the DM in hot mode when their intensity, measured by the func-
tion M(c; s;a;!;t) which represents the DM’s sensitivity to the cues, exceeds some
exogenously given threshold MT. These functions summarize the working of the
HFM.
Since people become sensitized to cues through repeated use, another assump-
tionofthemodelis M(c; s0
t;a;!;t) < M(c; s00
t ;a;!;t)for s00
t > s0
t and M(c;0;a;!;t) <
MT.
Let T(st;a) = f! 2 
 : M(c; s;a;!;t)  MTg. The DM enters the hot mode if
and only if ! 2 T(st;a). Moreover, let pa
s;t = (T(st;a)) denote the probability of
entering the hot mode at time t in addictive state s and lifestyle a.
An increase in the addictive state st raises the likelihood of entering the hot
mode at any moment, because the sensitivity to random environmental cues has
increased. So, by assumption, at each time instant pa
s+1  pa
s, pa





Instate st theDMreceivesanimmediatehedonicpayows;t(es; xt;at) = u(es)+
vs(xt;at) where utility derived from non-addictive goods, u(es), is assumed to be
separable from utility derived from addictive consumption. According to assump-
tion 2 in the B&R model ws;t is increasing, unbounded, strictly concave and twice
dierentiablewithboundedsecondderivativeinthevariablees. Moreovervs(xt;at) 
3We re-write the B&R model by emphasizing that non addicted goods es depend on the addictive
state s. The reason for this choice will become clear in the next Sections, where an extension of the
model will be presented. Taking the composite good e as the numeraire implies that es is the amount




s represents the baseline payo associated with successful absten-
tion in state s and activity a and ba
s represents the marginal instantaneous beneﬁt
from use the individual receives in state s after taking activity a. By the same as-







s. Taking a quadratic
approximation in all the arguments except es the instantaneous payo function is:
ws;t(es; xt;at) = ba



























u(es) = elog(es) + eelog(es) + xextes + sestet;
ua
s = w(st) + u(es):
ba
s and u(es) are increasing and concave in x and e, w(st) is decreasing in s and
the interaction terms xe and se are zero by the separability assumption. Mono-
tonicity and concavity of ba
s and u(es) follow from standard arguments, whereas
the properties of w(st) incorporate the eect of past usage on current well being,
i.e. tolerance, deterioration of health, depression, illness, etc. (see ﬁgure 1).





























Figure 1: Payo functions.
The DM discounts future hedonic payos using an exponential discount func-
tion with discount factor . His choices in the cold mode correspond to the solu-
tion of a dynamic stochastic programming problem with a value function Vs() and



















0  h  S;
h   1 = maxf1; s   1g;
h + 1 = minfS; s + 1g
In equation (11) C is the set of decision states f(E;1);(E;0);(A;0);(R;0)g,
while 
a;x
s represents the probability of consuming the substance in state x with
contingent plan (a; x);  is a vector specifying all the model parameters. The
stationarity of equation (11) follows from the assumption that the DM takes his
decision at the beginning of each period. This model generates ﬁve distinctive
behavioral patterns of addiction:
a Unsuccessful attempts to quit occur when there is an unanticipated or antic-
ipated and suciently slow shift in parameters s= (ps;us;bs), from 0 to
00.
b Cue-triggered recidivism are associated with high exposure to relatively in-
tense cues, e.g. high realizations of c(a;!).
c Self-described mistakes occur when the DM chooses (E;0) or (A;0) in cold
mode, but then he enters the hot mode.
d Self-control through precommittment is given by the choice (R;0) which im-
plies a costly pre-commitment.
e Self-control through behavioral and cognitive therapy is modeled through
choice (A;0) which implies costly cue avoidance.4
We are particularly interested in the choice set (E;0). In this case impulses
to use are not forcedly controlled through rehabilitation, but abstinence occurs for
high enough MT, the threshold level impulses required to defeat cognitive control.
Our purpose is to ﬁnd mechanisms that decrease the probability of entering the
hot mode and the convenience to use when in cold mode so that the DM is inclined
to abstain from consumption for a reasonably long period of time 5. This implies
building a more complete model of cognitive control where such mechanisms in-
ﬂuence the likelihood of overriding the HFM-generated impulses by increasing the
threshold MT.
4Each of these patterns have been produced via numerical simulations.
5Clinicalpracticesuggeststhatwecanspeakofrecoveryafteraboutatleasttwoyearsofsustained
abstinence from use.
94.1 The process leading to natural recovery
We assume that consumption of addictive substances has negative eects as the ad-
dictive state s increases. This is consistent with assumptions on the payo function
w stated in B&R. However this model doesn’t refer to the role of time and age of
the DM in the payo. In Suranovic et al.(1999) a loss function is introduced in
a model of cigarettes’ smoking. Our model conceives a loss function accounting
for past experiences with addictive goods and for the future negative eects of cur-
rent addiction. We assume that, due to increasing awareness of both, the DM may
experience a change of perspective as he grows older sucient to induce quitting
even without an exogenous shock or a stressful event occurring to generate this
outcome.
As regards as future expected losses the DM evaluates future losses from cur-
rent addictive consumption by calculating the present discounted value of expected
reductions in the length of life. These future expected losses may aect behavior
in three distinct ways:
(i) they increase the threshold MTthus reducing the probability of entering the
hot mode. In our model the Mesolimbic Dopamine System plays an important role
indeterminingthechoicetoconsumeanaddictivegoodateachpointintime. How-
ever, structures in the frontal cortex may activate competing ”cognitive incentives”
by identifying alternative courses of action or projecting the future consequences
of choices (B&R, 2004, p. 1563). Higher cognitive incentives triggered by future
expected losses from addiction, could even override HFM-generated impulses.
(ii) They aect the dynamic programming decision process through the de-
creased probability of use .
(iii) They erode the marginal instantaneous beneﬁt from use.
Theeectofpastexperiences, instead, isaccountedforintroducingthevariable
H = Maxfstg, t = 0;1;:::;t 1 which is the DM’s maximum addictive state reached
up to the current time period.
Drawing from Suranovic et al.(1999) we assume that the DM is currently Y
years old and let T(Y) be the number of years remaining representing a non addict’s
life expectancy at age Y. T(Y) is linear in Y with T0(Y) < 0. An addict’s life
expectancy at age Y can be represented as T(Y)   H with  being a parameter
weighting the reduction in life expectancy caused by H.
The present value of an addict’s expected future utility stream (V) from con-







where r is the ﬁxed discount rate, e r(t Y) is the discount factor at time t and
bs;t is the individual’s expected utility of consuming the addictive good at time t.







is the average lost life caused by the maximum addictive state reached in
the past and by the current addictive state st.
For a DM aged Y and maximum addictive state H the present value of the
expected future losses at time t is given by:








In writing equation (5) we do not account for transition probabilities aecting the
evolution of addictive state st, because the DM evaluates future losses indepen-
dently from the speed of transition between addictive states.




















































Future losses increase with the addictive state. Higher addictive states elimi-
nate expected beneﬁts in the ﬁnal moments of life.
As the DM gets older, the loss function LY;H(s), which is a function of age,

















Future losses rise with age as one gets older, because the discount factor used
to weight end-of-life utility rises as aging draws one closer to the terminal date.
Stated dierently, due to discounting, end-of-life utilities are given more weight
as one gets closer to the terminal date, because they are closer to the present. On
the other hand, at a younger age, end-of-life utilities are given much less weight
because they are far away in the future.
In our model this loss function enters the cold mode of operating, in the value
function Vs (see equation (11)), as ba
s   LY;H.
As suggested by B&R (2004, p. 1582) developing a more complete model
of cognitive control in which future consequences may inﬂuence the likelihood
11of overriding HFM-generated impulses requires a more complex modeling of the
threshold MT.
Now let us specify the function M as:






where a 2 fR;E;Ag and M0 = M(s = 0).
On average the M function (which denotes the ”power” assigned to the drug
by the HFM-generated impulses) has a logistic shape, in line with the literature in
neurosciences and pharmacology. Di Chiara (2002), for instance, deﬁnes four dif-
ferent phases of addiction, delimited in Figure 2 by vertical dotted lines: controlled
drug use, drug abuse, drug addiction, post-addiction stage.
In the ﬁrst stage, as a result of curiosity, peer pressure, social factors, person-
ality traits, etc. (life styles a and environmental cues c) the DM comes into con-
tact with a drug. Sensitization facilitates further experimentation and increases the
power of the HFM (M weakly increasing in s). At this stage the subject responds
to the drug-related stimuli in a controlled manner.
With repeated drug exposure the DM progressively enters the stage of drug
abuse. In this stage sensitization becomes very powerful and drug-related stimuli
are associated to craving (M strongly increasing in s).
The stage of drug addiction is characterized by the preceding stage to which is
added that of tolerance and physical dependence (the slope of the M function starts
decreasing).
In the post-addiction stage abstinence as well as sensitization progressively











Figure 2: The M function.
12This M function satisﬁes the assumptions of the B&R model (see B&R, 2004,
p. 1565):
 M(c; s;R;!)  M(c; s;A;!)  M(c; s;E;!), i.e. the lifestyle aects the DM
sensitization to environmental cues;
 M(c; s0;a;!) < M(c; s00;a;!) for s0 < s00 and M(c;0;a;!) < MT, where
MT is the HFM activating threshold. M(c; s;a;!) > MT allows the DM to
enter the HOT mode.
Moreover we introduce the following ASSUMPTION 1: The power function
M is strictly increasing and twice continuously dierentiable in s.
4.1.1 The Implicit Cognitive Appraisal Function
Berridge and Robinson (2003, p. 508) explain that the motivational component of
reward can be parsed into two dierent psychological components: an implicit and
an explicit one. Explicit processes are consciously experienced whereas implicit
psychological processes may not operate at a conscious level. They also stress that
additional psychological processes of cognitive awareness can transform the prod-
ucts of implicit processes into explicit representations. This is also consistent with
recent advances in neuroscience that strive to bridge the gap between moral and
biological lines and allow the addiction treatment “to reduce the rewarding prop-
erties of drugs while enhancing those of alternative reinforcers, inhibit conditioned
memories and strengthen cognitive control.” (see Baler et al., 2006).
We therefore introduce an “Implicit Cognitive Appraisal” process representing
cognitive incentives competing with the HFM’s generated impulses to use. Such
process incorporates future expected losses from addiction representing an addi-
tional psychological drive that may transform the implicit cognitive mechanism
into the dominant one thus overriding the HFM generated impulses. We assume
that:
a Past life events inﬂuence the likelihood of reducing consumption (see Cun-
ningham et al., 2005);
b future expected losses inﬂuence the likelihood of reducing consumption (see
Cunningham et al., 2005, Matzger et al., 2005 and Suranovic et al., 1999);
c competing cognitive incentives may override the HFM’s impulses to use (see
Berridge and Robinson, 2003).
The Implicit Cognitive Appraisal process (I) is modeled as a modiﬁed M func-
tion with initial condition I0 = I(s = 0) representing the a priori level of cognitive
control. Following Orphanides and Zervos (1995) we let the population of DMs
consist of two distinct groups: non addicts and potential addicts. For non addicts
13I0  M0 and for potential addicts I0 < M0. A non addict DM may never become
an addict, because its level of competing cognitive incentives is high enough to
decrease the probability of entering the hot mode. On the other hand I0 < M0
represents the case of a DM who has not yet gained experience with the addictive
good and is thus less aware of its potential consequences. We focus on this class
of DMs.




1 + ¯ I0(es   1);
(9)
where  is the same as in equation (8) and the initial condition is now deﬁned as
¯ I0 = I0 + 
LY;H: (10)
By deﬁnition I satisﬁes the following properties:
 I(s0;Y) < I(s00;Y) for s0 < s00;
 I(s;Y0) < I(s;Y00) for Y0 < Y00.
ASSUMPTION 2: I is strictly increasing in LY;H(s) and twice continuously
dierentiable in the variable s.
We let 
 in equation (10) indicate the presence of learning processes related
to past history of consumption, age and awareness of future expected losses. We
assume 0  
  1, where 
 = 1 implies perfect learning and 
 = 0 signals absence
of learning. Given I0 the presence of learning may drive the implicit cognitive in-
centives to override the HFM impulses to use for suciently high Y and H. Since
dierent individuals have dierent learning capacities and histories I0 and 
 ac-
count for DMs heterogeneity.
In Figure 3 we plot the I function corresponding to dierent values of the initial
condition ¯ I0.
For a given 
, the I function shifts upwards as time t and the addictive state s
increase so that dierent values of I may be associated with the same s reached at
dierent time periods. Such process may continue until the I function overrides the
HFM and the probability of entering the hot mode may even decline to zero. An
analogous process arises when the a priori level of cognitive control I0 increases,
as claimed in the following proposition.











































Figure 3: M and I functions corresponding to dierent assumptions on ¯ I0. Dashed
line: ¯ I0 < M0 (for 
LY;H < M0   I0), solid line: ¯ I0 = M0 (for 
LY;H = M0   I0),
dashdot line: ¯ I0 > M0 (for 
LY;H > M0   I0).
Since the loss function decreases the instantaneous marginal beneﬁt from use
and from proposition 1 we expect this self evaluation process to lead7 the DM
eventually to choose (E,0) when in cold mode and for a number of time periods
sucient to generate natural recovery. Taking into account clinical evidence re-
ported in Section 3, spontaneous remittance may be a result of the model depicted
in this Section.
We have made several numerical simulations of the model. Results of such
simulations, such as user’s behavior and the speciﬁc case of natural recovery, are
shown in the appendix.
Now let  be the parameters’ vector,  = (;rs;q;y;I0; M0;
) such that natural
recovery may occur.
PROPOSITION 2. Assume ﬁxed all the parameters in  except for I0:
(i) on average an increase in I0 lengthens the interval between the initial use
and the maximum addictive state H and shortens the interval between H and nat-
ural recovery.
(ii) On average an increase in I0 lowers the maximum addictive state H.
PROOF. (i) Given ¯ I0 = I0 + 
LY;H, an increase in ¯ I0 is determined by a change
in the a priori level of cognitive control I0. For a given stochastic process ! and
lifestyle a, this causes pa
s to decrease (see Proposition 1) at each t thus reducing
7Stated dierently, there exist a subset of the relevant parameters satisfying the conditions leading
to natural recovery.



























. Since by deﬁnition L(H;Y)









PROPOSITION 3. Assume ﬁxed all the parameters in  except for 
. A de-
crease in 
 lengthens the drug addiction stage and delays natural recovery.
PROOF. A decrease in 
 shifts the I function downwards. From Proposition
1 this implies an increase in pa
s which causes a delay in the eects of the loss
function.
5 Policy Implications
Public policies towards addictive substances usually aim at reducing negative ex-
ternalities (e.g. second hand smoke, social or familial discomfort connected to the
addictive state) and social costs (e.g. alcohol related violence and crime, road ac-
cidents and extra costs to the health and social security system) and at reducing
direct personal or health costs that may occur as a consequence of addiction.
Explaining natural recovery may have relevant policy implications because
it increases the importance of policies that rise the likelihood of successful self-
regulation in a non coercive way (Bernheim and Rangel, 2005, p. 9).
Bernheim and Rangel (2005) argue that if consumers are sometimes rational
and sometimes driven by cue-triggered mistakes, the traditional public policy ap-
proaches, i.e. regulation versus incentives, may produce undesirable results. While
strict regulation or prohibition may be mostly eective and discourage consump-
tion in rational individuals by raising the monetary and non-monetary costs of con-
sumption, it does not work that way if people incur in cue-triggered mistakes. If
addiction is the result of cue-triggered mistakes these measures only raise the costs
of consumption without reaching the target of reducing it. Similar considerations
apply to tax policies. While price increases of legal addictive substances (such as
alcohol and tobacco) may induce a reduction in demand in rational people, they
may only raise the costs of consumption if this is driven by compulsive choices.
Thus both criminalization and taxation may be socially counterproductive and in-
eective at reaching their goals, because those who become addicted incur higher
monetary costs.
Such conclusions, however, are modiﬁed if spontaneous remittance, i.e. spon-
taneous cessation of consumption, occurs through increased awareness of future
expected costs and through learning from past experiences. In this case policy
measures such as cognitive policies, education and information campaigns or a
combination of them may be best suited to activate cognitive control mechanisms,
but more traditional approaches such as regulation and taxation still play an impor-
tant role.
16Cognitive therapies may help consumers to activate a process of self evalu-
ation that raises the value of the future negative consequences of addiction thus
reinforcing the motivation to change habits. Education may also help identifying
the social, health and psychological consequences of substance abuse increasing
the present value of uncertain and remote future costs. Therefore, contrary to what
Bernheim and Rangel have suggested (2005, p.131), we believe that education
campaigns may be eective, to some extent, in reducing consumption even among
those already addicted and not only as a prevention policy to discourage initial
experimentation. Even though education and information campaigns may not al-
ter the mechanism through which individuals engage in compulsive use (i.e. the
HFM), they may help activating the competing cognitive incentive mechanisms
which trigger a process of self evaluation.
Moreover, the same type of role in triggering the competing cognitive incen-
tive mechanism may arise from regulation and/or taxation of addictive substances,
because they increase the monetary and non monetary costs of future consumption
as well as of current one. Once a process of self evaluation has been activated, even
more traditional policy measures may be of help in carrying out the mechanisms
of self appraisal which may lead to spontaneous quitting.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explain how natural recovery from addiction may arise from in-
creasing awareness of future and uncertain consequences of consumption and on
learning from past experiences. These processes may be critical for understanding
spontaneous remittance, a widespread yet unexplained pattern of addictive behav-
ior.
Introducing such self evaluation mechanisms our model explains how even
strongly addicted persons may ﬁnd their way out of substance abuse without the
utilization of professional help and it can also highlight the main factors driving
such process. Drawing from clinical and experimental research we introduce an
”Implicit Cognitive Appraisal” function depending on past experiences as well as
on future consequences of addictive consumption. Such function aects the DM
in two ways: it erodes the payo from use as the decision maker grows older and
it increases the cognitive control competing with the hedonic impulses to use, thus
reducing the probability of entering the hot mode.
Some of the policy implications of the B&R model are modiﬁed as follows.
Strict regulation or taxation of addictive substances may still play a role in ac-
tivating the cognitive control process, because they raise the monetary and non
monetary costs of current and future addiction. Moreover, education and infor-
mation campaigns can be eective policy measures not only to discourage initial
experimentation, but also to trigger a process of self evaluation. This process may
eventually lead to natural recovery, because it helps the DM identifying the social,
health and psychological consequences of substance abuse.
17We believe that the possibility of making cue-triggered mistakes greatly im-
proves our understanding of the phenomenon of addiction and also leads to counter
intuitive policy implications (see Section 5). However, our explanation of sponta-
neous remittance recovers an important role for cognitive processes and rational
decision making, because only when the DM becomes increasingly aware of the
costs and beneﬁts of addiction he can successfully overcome its hedonic impulses
to use.
18Appendix
This appendix contains some simulation results of the model. The simulations are
obtained by assigning appropriate values to the model parameters and maximizing
the value function reported in equation (4).
In the model the DM can operate in either of two modes: the hot mode and
the cold mode. The hot mode can be activated by environmental cues as well as
the DM’s history of use and lifestyle. In the cold mode the DM selects his most
preferred alternatives by imposing cognitive control.
The parameters of the functions M and I, speciﬁed by equation (8) and (9)
respectively, are the following:  = 0:1, M0 = 0:09, I0 = 0:07 and 
 = 1. The
function c(a;!) included in M is speciﬁed by c(a;!a) = k1
a + k2
a!a, where !a is a
normally distributed random process with variance 2 = 1 and mean depending on
the life style a. The parameters k1
a and k2
a depend on the lifestyle a.
The payo function ws;t is speciﬁed by equation (2), where x = 10, xx =
 0:5, s =  1:0, xs = 0:9, ss =  0:1, e = 30, ee =  1, es = ys.
Stochastic dynamic programming problem
The DM discounts future hedonic payos using an exponential discount function
with discount factor . His choices in the cold mode correspond to the solution of




















0  h  S;
h   1 = maxf1; s   1g;
h + 1 = minfS; s + 1g
In equation (11) C is the set of decision states f(E;1);(E;0);(A;0);(R;0)g,
while 
a;x
s represents the probability of consuming the substance in state x with
contingent plan (a; x). The stationarity of equation (11) follows from the assump-
tion that the DM takes his decision at the beginning of each period.
At each time period t and in cold mode, the DM takes two decisions in se-
quence: he chooses the lifestyle a and whether consuming (x = 1) or not con-
suming (x = 0) the addictive good. His choices in the cold mode correspond to
the solution of the dynamic stochastic programming problem of equation 11 in the
set of decision states C = f(E;1);(E;0);(A;0);(R;0)g, where 
a;x
s represents the
probability of consuming the substance in state s with contingent plan (a; x). The
DM discounts future hedonic payos at a constant rate . S is the highest addictive
state.
The problem can be solved recursively as follows:


















Equation 12 implicitly deﬁnes VS as a function of VS 1 by
VS = h
S(VS 1): (13)










where the function h
k+1 is deﬁned implicitly by the previous steps. Hence,




























Equation (16) is nonlinear in the variable V1 and can be solved numerically.

















Step 4: computation of optimal values the optimal sequence ˆ V0, ˆ V1, ˆ V2, :::, ˆ VS
is backward recovered by applying the functions h
k deﬁned by equation (15).
Simulation results
In this section we show some simulations8 obtained by initializing the model as
follows:
 S = 50;
 ys=800 $;
 time period t: 1 week;
8Numerical simulations and dynamic programming are run on MATLAB 7.0.4.











Figure 4: Frequency of decisions for each addictive state s.
 simulation length: 1000 periods (' 20 years);
 cost of addictive substance: 200 $;
 costs for rehabilitation: 250 $.
 decisions set: (E;1);(E;0);(A;0);(R;0).
Figure 4 shows the probability that in the whole simulation time and in addic-
tive state s the DM chooses one of the four decisions.
Figure 5 shows the cold mode decision making process and the actual decision
making (Hedonic Forecasting Mechanism active)and, in particular, how a DM who
starts a process of self evaluation (as modelled in this paper) may eventually stop
entering the hot mode and always choose (E;0) when in cold mode (see also Figure
6).












DM’s rational choice for 0<s<S












DM’s actual choice for 0<s<S (hot mode active)
Figure 5: Choices over time: cold mode (top) and hot mode (bottom) decision
making.
















































es when a self-evaluation process is intro-
duced in decision making leading to natural recovery.
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